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This paper compares the foreign policies of the Republic of Croatia towards the 
regions of Latin America and the Middle East, aiming to identify the similarities 
and the differences. During the 1990s Croatia was primarily interested in dip-
lomatic recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations. In the period 
of 2001-2012 Latin America and the Middle East were not able to contribute to 
the achievement of main foreign policy goals – membership in NATO and the 
EU – so they stayed out of the interests of foreign policy creators. We argue 
that Croatia has not established a defined foreign policy towards the mentioned 
regions, and that political significance of a particular Latin American and Middle 
Eastern country was determined by its economic importance (Croatian export) 
and in the case of Latin America by the size of the diaspora. The first section 
briefly outlines the first decade of Croatian foreign policy (1991-2001) and the 
second section focuses on the empirical assessment of the determinants of 
Croatian foreign policy toward the countries of Latin America and the Middle 
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East during the period ranging between 2001 and 2012. Bilateral relations be-
tween Croatia and Latin American countries are good but not developed. The 
reason for this is the geographical distance of Latin America and perception 
of low significance of majority of the countries, and that will not change. On 
the other hand, there is no correlation between economic and diplomatic im-
portance of Middle Eastern countries for Croatia. Therefore, Croatia’s foreign 
policy towards these countries was not guided by economic incentives.
Key words: EU, NATO, Croatia, Latin America, Middle East, foreign policy
1. introduction
We should differentiate foreign policy from bilateral relations. In this 
sense, whether we are talking about "normalisation", "rapprochement", 
"re-engagement" (Limaye, 2010) or "revitalization" but also "maintain-
ing" of bilateral relations, it is a mutual process. Bilateral relations have 
to be "mutually reinforcing" (Ibid: 312). Relationships between the coun-
tries, mutual interest or even some sort of partnership in a specific area 
(such as security), have to be based on a deliberate mutual effort (Ibid.). 
In a nutshell, both sides must be active in this effort. Foreign policy, on 
the other hand, is an "aggregate of standpoints, acts and measures that 
some state has and undertakes towards foreign countries in an effort 
to protect its own interests" (Nick, 1999: 240). Foreign policy actors, in 
this sense and within the constitutional framework of each country, are 
heads of states, parliaments (especially their foreign policy committees) 
and governments (Ibid: 240). Therefore, foreign policy represents efforts 
of a certain country aimed towards foreign countries, which do not nec-
essarily include mutual or reciprocal efforts.
The aim of this paper is to compare the foreign policies of the Repub-
lic of Croatia towards the regions of Latin America and the Middle East, 
and to identify similarities and differences. During the 1990’s Croatia 
was primarily interested in diplomatic recognition and the establish-
ment of diplomatic relations. During the period ranging between 2001 
and 2012 Latin America and the Middle East were not able to contrib-
ute to the achievement of main foreign policy goals – membership in 
NATO and the EU – so they stayed out of the interests of foreign policy 
creators. Our hypothesis is that Croatia did not have a defined foreign 
policy towards the mentioned regions, and that the political significance 
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of a particular Latin American and Middle Eastern country was deter-
mined by economic importance (Croatian export) and, in the case of 
Latin America, the size of the diaspora.
To confirm our hypothesis we will use quantitative analysis. The pa-
per is organized as follows – an introduction, two sections and a con-
clusion. In the first section we will briefly review the Croatian foreign 
policy towards Latin America and the Middle East during the period 
between 1991 and 2001 and in the second section we analyse the Cro-
atian foreign policy toward the countries of the two mentioned regions 
during the period between 2001 and 2012.
2. Croatian foreign policy towards latin america and the 
middle east during the period between 1991 and 2001
Croatian foreign policy is an organized activity of the Republic of Cro-
atia that attempts to maximize its interests in the relations with other 
countries and subjects in the international community. Vukadinović 
(1997: 236-237) claims that from the very beginning Croatian foreign 
policy was being created as conscious, organized and politically coher-
ent activity, directed toward achieving a wide range of foreign affairs 
objectives. In 1990s, Vukadinović differentiates three stages of Croatian 
foreign policy. The first stage was the formation of the state when Cro-
atia was forced to create a foreign policy and foreign and diplomatic 
personnel at the same time. The recognition of the state, the fight against 
Serbian aggression and the liberation of Croatian territory were the 
most important goals.
At the same time, with its independence, Croatia became a small 
country (Vukadinović, 1993; Jović, 2011). Hence, maintaining prior 
global politics that Yugoslavia had adopted became impossible at this 
point. Croatia hence needed to find new standards in its relations to 
other countries (Vukadinović, 1993: 125). This was not only true of 
Croatia, but also concerning other former socialist countries that found 
themselves in a new position and had to change their foreign policies 
from globalism into something more appropriate and turn to Europe. 
Furthermore, during the time near the breakup of Yugoslavia, it was 
sometimes emphasised that nonalignment was "dragging Yugoslavia 
to Africa" (but also Asia) instead of Europe (Vukadinović, 1991: 178). 
Croatia, alongside Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, 
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while still a part of Yugoslavia, decided to "renounce" nonalignment and 
aligned themselves with the European option (Ibid.). And indeed, in 
the beginning Croatia completely ignored the nonaligned countries, al-
though later some small steps in the form of recognition of Croatia and 
the establishment of diplomatic relations were made.
The loss of interest and alienation from the Nonalignment move-
ment, the Mediterranean, but also the Middle East in a broader sense, 
were not only caused by the new realities of Croatian foreign policy. As 
Švob-Đokić (1996: 166) notices, although the Mediterranean was con-
sidered as a crossroad between North and South, East and West, the 
cradle of civilisations and a point for the exchange of goods, this no-
tion of the Mediterranean has changed and it became a bit archaic. The 
Mediterranean has become the cradle of crises, political turmoil, the 
"divided sea", and the denial of multiculturalism and a hotbed of intol-
erance. In other words, the Mediterranean became both the place where 
civilizations clashed (Huntington, 1997), and where clashes within civi-
lizations occurred. The 1990’s were the years of Middle Eastern, Balkan 
and Algerian crises (Švob-Đokić, 1996).
Furthermore, the Mediterranean countries, in this context, have 
shown very low interest for inter-Mediterranean cooperation. The 
Countries of the Mediterranean South and North have shown more in-
terest in cooperation with the EU, while mutual exchange and cooper-
ation were largely ignored. The Mediterranean is an area where mutual 
cooperation was never standardized and rarely successfully organized 
(Ibid: 173). The dominant forms of relations were when the weaker 
countries put an effort to affiliate themselves with the stronger ones. In 
a nutshell, the Arab league, the Black sea basin and the Balkan countries 
focused themselves on the relations with "global" partners, such as the 
US or the EU, and not on improving and deepening mutual relations 
(Ibid.).
Croatian foreign policy and diplomacy have a rich history in the 
Mediterranean area, from the times of the Dubrovnik Republic until 
Tito’s Yugoslavia. However, with its independence Croatia was forced to 
build a new state apparatus, including the diplomatic service, with par-
allel involvement in the construction of the military and dealing with 
military aggression on its own territory (Andrlić, 2009).
As stated above, only small steps were made, such as the recognition 
of Croatia and the establishment of diplomatic relations. In some cases 
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not even that much was achieved. Here we will focus on 18 countries1 – 
Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lib-
ya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) and Yemen.2
In the early 1990’s Croatian diplomacy was very successful in Latin 
American countries largely thanks to Croatian immigrants. Numerous 
formal and informal meetings took place with the Argentinean presi-
dent Carlos Menem and Argentina recognized Croatia as early as 16th of 
January 1992. From the Croatian representative office in Buenos Aires, 
efforts were made for diplomatic recognition of Croatia by Uruguay 
(January 16th, 1992), Paraguay (January 27th, 1992), Peru (March 15th, 
1  Bellin (2004) includes 21 countries in the Middle East area: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, 
Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, the Palestinian Authority, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, UAE, and Yemen. At the same time she excluded four coun-
tries that, although are member of the Arab league, are too remote: Somalia, Mauritania, Djibouti 
and Comoro islands. Long, Reich and Gasirowski (2011) under the countries of the same region 
include 14 major countries: Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, 
Libya, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia; five smaller countries of the Persian Gulf: Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Qatar, UAE and Oman; and Palestine. In our analysis we will focus on 18 mentioned countries. 
We shall also exclude the countries that Bellin (2004) has excluded. Furthermore, we shall exclude 
Sudan as Long, Reich and Gasirowski (2011) have excluded. However, we shall also exclude Turkey 
because it is a NATO member and an EU candidate country. Next, we shall also exclude Palestine 
because the "two state solution" was not yet achieved, thus Palestine is not a sovereign country.
2  Algeria recognized Croatia on 24th of April 1992 and diplomatic relations were established 
later that year, on October 15th. Bahrain recognized Croatia on January the 18th 1993 and diplo-
matic relations were established on the very same day. Egypt recognized Croatia on 16th of April 
1992, and again establishment of diplomatic relations came soon after on October 1st of the same 
year. There is no date when Iraq recognized Croatia, but diplomatic relations were established on 
January the 4th 2005. Iran’s recognition came on March the 15th 1992, and a month later, on April 
the 18th, diplomatic relations were established. Israel recognized Croatia on April the 16th 1992, 
and diplomatic relations were established some years after on September 4th 1997. Yemen recog-
nized Croatia on May the 22nd 192, and the establishment of diplomatic relations came on January 
the 17th the next year. Jordan recognized Croatia on May 17th 1992, and diplomatic relations were 
established two years later on June 29th 1994. Lebanon recognized Croatia on July 7th 1992, and 
diplomatic relations were again established two years later on 5th of December 1994. Libya recog-
nized Croatia on March 17th 1992, but the establishment of diplomatic relations came much later 
on 30th of March 2000. Morocco recognized Croatia on 27th of April 1992, and the establishment of 
diplomatic relations took place two months later on 26th of June. Oman recognized Croatia on April 
the 24th 1992, and only a lot later, on June the 30th 1997, diplomatic relations between two countries 
were established. Saudi Arabia recognized Croatia on August the 22nd 1994, and diplomatic rela-
tions were established the next year on June the 8th. There is no date when Syria recognized Croatia, 
but diplomatic relations were established on 29th of August 1997. Tunisia recognized Croatia on 
26th of April 1992, and diplomatic relations were established on January 30th 1993. UAE recognized 
Croatia on April the 18th 1992, and diplomatic relations between two countries were established lat-
er that year on June the 23rd (www.mvep.hr). Even some of these dates show the level of importance 
of these countries for Croatian foreign policy.
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1992), Bolivia (January 29th, 1992) and Venezuela (May 6th, 1992). At 
the same time, diplomatic and logistic humanitarian aid was being ar-
ranged. During January of 1992 Chile (January 16th) and Brazil (Janu-
ary 24th) recognized Croatia as well.3 The United Nations, in order to 
prevent the spreading of war on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, 
declared an embargo on weapons trade. Because of this, Croatia was 
forced to acquire weapons illegally in order to defend itself.
The first two Latin American countries that recognized Croatia – 
Argentina and Chile – helped immensely. The Croatian public was si-
lently in favour of the embargo breach since the illegal weapons were 
required for the defence of Croatia. After international recognition, 
Croatia used its presence in international institutions and initiated an 
action to end the war, liberate its territory and start peaceful reinte-
gration. At the same time, relations with countries that had a friend-
ly attitude toward Croatia and that became our allies in our fight for 
independence were gaining strength. Although Latin America was 
friendly, it was no longer a foreign policy priority. After the cessation 
of hostilities, Croatia was able to focus on the development of its re-
lations with its neighbours, prioritizing relations with European in-
stitutions, developing economic relations with the rest of the world 
and simultaneously strengthening its national security (Kos-Stanišić, 
2010: 35-37).
At the end of the "old millennium", the goal of "returning home to 
Europe" where Croatia belongs was formulated. Jović (2011: 10-11) em-
phasizes that idea of "back to Europe" meant back to Central Europe 
or, more precisely, back to Austro-Hungarian circle. Austria, Hungary, 
Slovenia, Czech Republic, Slovakia were already EU candidates, only 
Croatia was missing. After parliamentary and presidential elections in 
2000 the fourth stage started and new priorities of Croatian foreign pol-
icy were determined – accession to NATO and EU.4
3  Croatia was recognised by Colombia on March 3rd, 1992; Mexico May 25th, 1992; Panama May 
28th, 1992; Guatemala December 22nd, 1992; Cuba May 22nd, 1995; Costa Rica October 19th, 1995; 
Nicaragua March 29th, 1996; Ecuador February 22nd,1996. There is no date of recognition, just the 
date of beginning of diplomatic relations for the Dominican Republic February 5th, 2001; El Salva-
dor July 24th, 1997; Haiti October 15th, 1999; Honduras September 20th, 1999 (www.mvep.hr).
4  Beširević (2013: 88-90) argues that the real Europeanization of Croatian foreign policy began 
with the launching of the process of Stabilization and Association in 1999. However, right after the 
constitutional changes in 2001 the process of adaptation to democratic values of the EU had begun.
B. Zgurić, L. Kos-stanišić, s. Domjančić: Comparison of Croatian foreign poLiCy ...
IzvornI znanstvenI rad  PrImljen: 11.5.2015.
11Europske studije – European Studies   2015  1  (1)  5-32
In the post war period Croatia was guided, in the relations with 
other states, by two groups of goals: the first group comprised of the 
efforts of achieving membership in the EU and NATO; and the other 
group were the ad hoc goals which were mostly reactions to current 
events. When discussing the first group of aims, an eschatological ap-
proach could be noted. These aims were understood as the end of the 
road, a final purpose of the totality of engagement; by achieving them, 
the end of our current labours and the beginning of our enjoyment in 
the bliss of their achievement would logically follow. The first and the 
last document that clearly shaped Croatian foreign policy aims was 
the National Security Strategy from the year 2002 (www.morh.hr). 
That was the only document which, next to the goals, was also shaping 
the foreign policy, thus it was shaping the values and interests. Never 
at a later date was Croatia trying to shape its foreign policy with some 
policy document. The other group of aims that were constituted as a 
reaction towards some events in the region actually represent a group 
of efforts to take position, not so much regarding the event itself, as it 
is more an effort to take position regarding the attitudes of some other 
international actors. Therefore, we can only conditionally talk about 
goals due to the fact that a goal is something that we are trying to 
achieve with our active engagement. Unfortunately, here we can only 
talk about finding a way to, with our attitudes or actions, integrate 
as seamlessly as possible into the mainstream policies (primarily of 
NATO or/and the EU).
The decision of the European Council in Thessaloniki in 2003, where 
the EU committed itself to gradually integrating the Western Balkan 
states into the Union, led to an irreversible political twist. With the 
transformation of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), all Croatian 
parliamentary parties accepted the accession to NATO and the EU as 
important political goals. Croatia applied for the EU membership in 
2003 and was a EU membership candidate country since June 2004. In 
October 2001 Croatia became the second country to sign the Stabili-
zation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU following the 
breakdown of the former Yugoslavia, although the agreement did not 
enter into force until February 2005. In June 2006 the EU opened ac-
cession negotiations with Croatia, but they were stuck due to Croatian 
decision to introduce Ecological and Fisheries Protection Zone (ZERP), 
Slovenian blockade, and problems with the ICTY and the chapter on the 
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judiciary. Negotiations ended in 2011 and in December of the same year 
EU and Croatia signed the accession treaty.
On the webpage of the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Eu-
ropean Integration in March 2008 we found basic information on Cro-
atian foreign policy and its main objectives (www.mvpei.hr). Croatian 
basic foreign policy aims were the preservation and strengthening of 
peace and understanding between countries and nations, strengthening 
of the international position of Croatia, the creation of conditions for 
the realisation of basic strategic priorities by joining the European and 
transatlantic political, security and economic integrations, fulfilment of 
the assumed international obligations, resolving of all opened issues re-
maining after the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, establishing good 
neighbourly relations and co-operation with neighbouring countries 
based on the principles of equality and reciprocity, establishing friendly 
relations with the most important actors and countries in the world, 
strengthening the economic position of Croatia, and promoting the 
general image of Croatia.
The basic foreign policy aims were: 1) EU membership; 2) NATO 
membership; 3) enhancing relations with neighbouring countries; 4) 
developing bilateral and multilateral international co-operation; 5) pro-
motion of Croatian economy; 6) overall promotion of Croatia. Third 
Countries in the regions of Latin America and Middle East were not men-
tioned. However, they could be found in objectives number 4, 5 and 6.
Croatian foreign policy objective was to develop political and eco-
nomic relations with all democratic countries in the world and thus, 
with the Third Countries5 democracies. The objective of Croatia was to 
increase the export of Croatian products to all the markets of the world 
and to attract foreign investment. The overall positive image of Croatia 
should be primarily based on its cultural promotion worldwide (Kos-
Stanišić, 2010: 36-37).
5  We consider Third Countries to be non EU and/or NATO member countries.
B. Zgurić, L. Kos-stanišić, s. Domjančić: Comparison of Croatian foreign poLiCy ...
IzvornI znanstvenI rad  PrImljen: 11.5.2015.
13Europske studije – European Studies   2015  1  (1)  5-32
3. Croatian foreign policy towards latin america and the 
middle east during the 2001-2012 period
Croatian foreign policy is reduced to foreign affairs, which means that it 
is reduced almost exclusively to the technical segment and, to a smaller 
degree, to a coordinative function of sector policies with foreign policy 
implications. In this segment, as an example, we can mention the so-
called economic diplomacy which is primarily only a reverberant name 
for facilitating services of easy contacts between the interested parties in 
the economic sector.
How Croatian foreign policy in the last fifteen or so odd years was fo-
cused on two general goals – NATO and EU membership – bilateral re-
lations during that period were limited to areas that directly aided to the 
achievement of these goals. Foreign policy actually had the attributes of 
lobbying. Due to the fact that the NATO membership was understood 
primarily from the aspects of defence and security, foreign policy was, 
in the context of NATO membership, doubly limited – on the one hand 
it was limited to the key member states (US, Germany, Britain, France), 
and on the other hand it was limited to a specific spectrum of defence 
and security themes). Undoubtedly the NATO arrangements, from the 
Partnership for Peace to the programmes of membership preparations, 
were used as a tool for the democratic consolidation of the regime. 
However, the western political elites, as well as a large number of an-
alysts, were exceptionally inclined to overestimating the "NATO influ-
ence" on democratization of transitional states, including Croatia. It is 
correct that NATO (or rather western political elites) aimed for general 
democratization, but it is also correct that in Croatia this was translated 
from political to the military field. The ability to accept the new security 
reality, in the way of believable and trustworthy positioning within that 
reality, was exchanged for the declamation how Croatia is aware of all 
the possible security threats that can arise in this globalised world. Even 
the responsibility for peace and security of the region and the world 
was mostly highlighted through the prism of sending soldiers to the 
military missions ("peace supporting missions"), which was at the same 
time the strongest argument that we are ready for NATO membership 
(Domjančić, 2012: 70-71).
There were many similarities with Latin America and the relations 
with the Middle East had no influence on achieving the main Croatian 
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goals. Hence this area was left out of reach and interests of Croatian 
foreign policy. One of the saving formulas of the so-called Croatian for-
eign policy – reducing the general foreign policy issues to narrow sector 
areas and then their treatment in the sense of the foreign policy sur-
rogates – in this case was not applicable for numerous reasons. Name-
ly, the successful use of the defence and security area in the context of 
NATO membership, but also in some other aspects, was not applica-
ble in relations with Latin America. In the area of defence and security 
Croatia had no cooperation with Latin America, no accredited military 
envoys, no signed agreements, not even occasional courtesy meetings. 
Therefore Latin America did not meet the requirements of the main 
criteria which were guiding Croatian foreign policy actions up to this 
point: 1) it did not have influence on achieving two main goals (NATO 
and EU); 2) it did not generate issues which would demand Croatia’s 
reaction on a daily political basis, or rather in the context of the NATO 
and EU membership. On the issues that, in the global sense, originate in 
the Latin American area (or areas) Croatia can stay quiet or ignore these 
issues without even being noticed.
Concerning Middle East, the situation is quite different. This region 
is the main generator of global (in)security and is present in general 
foreign policy themes throughout the world. Therefore, in the context 
of the EU membership, Croatia cannot ignore this region. However, as 
the reduction of the general foreign policy themes to the defence and se-
curity ones is one of the significant attributes of Croatia’s foreign policy, 
the absence of a clear Croatian policy towards the Middle East is more 
easily concealed.
3.1. Croatian foreign policy towards Latin America
This section argues that during the period between 2001 and 2012 Cro-
atia did not have a defined foreign policy towards Third Countries (non 
EU and/or NATO members), and the political significance of a particu-
lar Latin American country was determined by economic importance 
(Croatian export) and the size of the diaspora. To test this hypothesis 
we have used quantitative analysis. In order to determine the degree 
of political-diplomatic significance of a Third Country in the region of 
Latin America to Croatia in the period between 2001 and 2012 we have 
created Table 1.
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Argentina YES YES YES (5) YES NO
Bolivia NO YES YES NO NO
Brazil YES YES YES (7) YES NO
Chile YES YES YES (9) YES YES (3)
Dom. Rep. NO NO YES NO NO
Ecuador NO NO YES NO NO
El Salvador NO NO YES NO NO
Guatemala NO NO YES NO NO
Haiti NO NO YES NO NO
Honduras NO NO YES NO NO
Colombia NO NO YES (1) NO NO
Costa Rica NO NO YES NO NO
Cuba NO NO YES (12) YES YES (1)
Mexico NO YES YES (3) YES NO
Nicaragua NO NO YES NO NO
Panama NO NO YES NO NO
Paraguay NO NO YES (1) NO NO
Peru NO YES YES (1) NO NO
Uruguay NO YES YES (1) NO NO
Venezuela NO YES YES NO NO
In order to achieve the specific goals, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
applied different foreign policy techniques and instruments, so the de-
pendent variable was the primary means of political-diplomatic activity 
which is the main form of government activity directed towards other 
countries (the existence of Croatian diplomatic mission; the existence 
of Croatian consulate; the existence of signed bilateral agreements and 
acts; the existence of inter-parliamentary friendship groups between 
Croatia and a particular country; state visits). The source of information 
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for the analysis were web pages of the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs (now Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs), web pages of the 
Croatian Parliament, internal documents from the Croatian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Department for Central and South America and the 
documents from the Department for North America.
According to Table 1 we can confirm that in the period between 2001 
and 2012:
Firstly – Croatia maintained diplomatic missions in Argentina, Chile 
and Brazil, and three consulates in Argentina (Tucumán, Córdoba and 
Rosario), two in Chile (Punta Arenas, Antofagasta) and one in Brazil, 
Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela, Uruguay and Mexico;
Secondly – Croatia had signed 12 new bilateral agreements with 
Cuba (all together there are 16), nine new bilateral agreements with 
Chile (all together 17), seven new bilateral agreements with Brazil (all 
together eight), five new bilateral agreements with Argentina (all togeth-
er 11), three new bilateral agreements with Mexico (all together four), 
and one new bilateral agreement with Uruguay (all together four), Peru 
(all together two), Paraguay (all together two) and Colombia (all to-
gether two) – Croatia only had agreements that established diplomatic 
relations with all other Latin American countries;
Thirdly – Inter-parliamentary friendship groups existed between 
Croatia and Brazil, Croatia and Chile, Croatia and Cuba, Croatia and 
Argentina and Croatia and Mexico;
Fourthly – State visits, the highest expression of friendly relations 
between two sovereign states, in this case visit of the Croatian president, 
prime minister or minister of foreign affairs. Croatian president Stjepan 
Mesić (2005), ministers of foreign affairs Tonino Picula (2001) and Ko-
linda Grabar Kitarović (2005), visited Chile.6 Croatian president Stjepan 
Mesić (2009) also visited Cuba for the second time.7
6  Croatia as a future EU member was invited to EU-CELAC summit in Santiago de Chile in 
January 2013 and it signed Memorandum of Understanding between the Croatian Government 
and the Government of the Republic of Chile on the Partnership and Cooperation (Memorandum 
on Strategic Partnership).
7  Bilateral relations between Republic of Croatia and Cuba are good and friendly, and they orig-
inated during the time of Nonalignment. More concretely, two countries cooperate in the Mixed 
inter-governmental committee that deals with economic, political, cultural and scientific coop-
eration. President of the Republic of Croatia Stjepan Mesić in the year 2006 participated in the 
summit of the Non-Aligned movement in Havana, where he lobbied and got support for Republic 
of Croatia to become the non-permanent member of the Security Council. In September of 2009 
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Depending on how many indicators are present for a certain Latin 
American country, we have classified them in three categories. The first 
category has a high degree of political-diplomatic significance (five "yes" 
– Chile), second category is of medium significance (four "yes" – Argen-
tina, Brazil; and three "yes" – Mexico, Cuba), and third category is of 
little significance (two and one "yes").












The countries with which Croatia has established only diplomatic 
relations or has signed just one agreement during period between 2001 
and 2012 are seen as irrelevant (Colombia, Paraguay, Costa Rica, Do-
minican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, El Salvador, 
Nicaragua and Panama).
The independent variable was economic importance, e.g. Croatian 
export to a particular Latin American country (the source of economic 
data was the Central Bureau of Statistics and the Croatian Chamber of 
Economy) and number of immigrants of Croatian origin (the source 
were internal documents from the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
To rank all the countries of Latin America, according to their impor-
tance for the Croatian economy in the period between 2001 and 2012 
we created a table of Croatian export to Latin America in thousands of 
Euros (see Appendix 1) and Chart 1. We used the data from the Central 
Bureau of Statistics and the Croatian Chamber of Economy. According 
to export data from 2001 to 2012 it was easy to identify the economic 
significance of each Latin American country for the Croatian economy. 
Panama was in first place with 239.5 million Euros in exports, main-
Mesić made an official visit to Cuba. On that occasion three memorandums on cooperation were 
signed (on culture, sport and high education).
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ly ships and nautical equipment that made up over 96 % of exports. It 
should be noted that there is a general trend that ships are registered 
under a flag of convenience, and the Panamanian flag is very popular, so 
we counted just 4 % of the amount – 9,58 millions of Euros.
The independent variable was also the number of immigrants of Cro-
atian origin (the source were the internal documents from the Croatian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs). There is a large number of Croatians and 
descendants of Croatian emigrants living in Argentina (according to an 
estimation over 250,000 around 8,000 born in Croatia). The estimation 
is that around 200,000 people in Chile are of Croatian origin (almost 
1.3 % of the total number of inhabitants in Chile), as well as around 
900 Croatian citizens that are living in Chile (persons born in Croatia 
and the descendants of emigrants who received Croatian citizenship). 




Chart1: Croatian export to Latin America in millions of Euros (2001-2012) 
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In Brazil there are around 25,000 descendants of Croatian emigrants, in 
Peru 5,000, in Bolivia 4,000, in Paraguay 5,000, in Venezuela 5,000, in 
Colombia 3,000 and in Uruguay 3,000. Variable measuring the size of 
diaspora is measured by a number of citizens of Croatian origin living 
in these countries. Given large differences in the size of immigrant com-
munities ranging from 250,000 to less than 5,000, this variable is also 
measured as a natural logarithm of the number of citizens of Croatian 
origin. All the values on all three variables are averages from the peri-
od between 2001 and 2012. Variable measuring the political-diplomat-
ic importance is constructed by adding several elements that identify 
the strength of political-diplomatic links. These include the presence of 
an embassy, presence of a consulate and the presence of an inter-par-
liamentary friendship group and an occurrence of a state visit. All of 
these elements are coded as 0 or 1 if any of the elements are present. The 
fifth element includes the number of bilateral treaties signed in a peri-
od between 2001 and 2012, and here countries are separated in three 
groups, where countries with only a diplomatic recognition treaty are 
coded as 1, countries that have between one and three other treaties are 
coded as 2, and countries that have more than four treaties are coded as 
3. The variable measuring the strength of political-diplomatic links is 
constructed by adding all these five elements in a single variable where 
each element is composing 20 % of the final value of the variable. The 
contribution of the variable measuring the number of bilateral treaties 
is calculated by dividing this variable by 3.
The variable determining the economic importance is measured by 
the size of Croatian exports to countries of Latin America measured in 
Euros. Given the presence of a very high range of values which reflect 
not only economic importance, but also the size of the country, and the 
presence of outliers with very high values, this variable is converted so 
that a natural log of the number measuring the size of exports is taken. 
Preliminary analysis shows a high degree of correlation between politi-
cal-diplomatic importance and economic importance (r=0.59, t=3.13), 
and political-diplomatic importance and the size of diaspora (r=0.63, 
t=3.52). The strength of these relationships is confirmed for both vari-
ables in a simple linear regression analysis. The results in Table 3 indi-
cate that the impact of these two variables is roughly equally important, 
and that they account for the bulk of variation in the strength of politi-
cal-diplomatic linkages between Latin American countries and Croatia. 
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It is apparent that this relationship is mostly driven by the importance 
of three or four countries with somewhat higher economic importance 
and very large number of citizens with Croatian ethnic origin, namely 
Argentina, Chile and Brazil.
Table 3: Regression analysis of determinants of political-diplomatic 
importance of Latin American countries for Croatia
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 0,018 (0,066)
Size of diaspora 0,033*** (0,009) 0,541
Economic importance 0,092*** (0,029) 0,482
Adjusted R square 0,591
N=20, ***p<0,001
3.2. Croatia’s foreign policy towards Middle East
This section will also try to determine the correlation between econom-
ic importance (trade in goods) and political importance of Middle East-
ern countries for Croatia. To determine the significance of a specific 
Middle Eastern country for Croatia in the period between 2001 and 
2012 we have created the following table. The sources of information 
for the analysis were again the web pages of the Ministry of Foreign and 
European Affairs, the web pages of the Croatian Parliament, internal 
documents from the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Division for 
Africa and Middle East.
From this table we can conclude the following:
Firstly – Croatia has diplomatic missions in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Is-
rael, Qatar, Libya and Morocco; four consular offices in Israel (Caesarea, 
Ashdod, Kfar Shmaryahu, and Jerusalem), one consular office in Egypt 
(Alexandria), Jordan (Amman), Lebanon (Beirut), Oman (Muscat), 
Syria (Damascus) and Tunisia (Tunis).
Secondly – Croatia has signed 10 bilateral agreements with Israel 
(out of 18), nine with Iran (out of 25) seven with Egypt (out of 20), sev-
en with Qatar (out of eight), six with Jordan (out of nine), five with Mo-
rocco (out of 11), five with Oman (out of six), three with Lebanon (out 
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of four), three with Libya (out of four), two with Algeria (out of three), 
two with Syria (out of three), two with the UAE (out of four), one with 
Kuwait (out of five) and one with Tunisia (out of two).
Thirdly – Inter-parliamentary friendship groups exist between Croa-
tia and Egypt, Croatia and Israel, Croatia and Iran, Croatia and Kuwait, 
and Croatia and Morocco.
Fourthly – High official visits, in this case visits of the head of state, 
prime minister and the foreign office minister, are considered as the 
highest expression of friendly relations between two countries. Croatia 
















Algeria YES NO YES (2) NO NO
Bahrain NO NO YES NO NO
Egypt YES YES YES (7) YES YES (5)
Iraq NO
(special mission)
NO YES NO NO
Iran YES NO YES (9) YES YES (1)
Israel YES YES YES (10) YES YES (10)
Yemen NO NO YES NO NO
Jordan NO YES YES (6) NO YES (7)
Qatar YES NO YES (7) NO YES (3)
Kuwait NO NO YES (1) YES NO
Lebanon NO YES YES (3) NO NO
Libya YES NO YES (3) NO YES (3)
Morocco YES NO YES (5) YES NO
Oman NO YES YES (5) NO YES (2)
Saudi Arabia NO NO YES NO NO
Syria NO YES YES (2) NO YES (1)
Tunisia NO YES YES (1) NO NO
UAE NO NO YES (2) NO YES (1)
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made 10 such visits to Israel, seven to Jordan, five to Egypt, three to Lib-
ya and Qatar, two to Oman, one to Iran, Syria and UAE.8 No such vis-
its have been made to Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Yemen, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia.
According to the presence of these indicators in a specific Middle 
Eastern country we can put them into three separate categories. First 
category (five "yes"– Egypt, Israel) represents a country of high politi-
cal-diplomatic significance for Croatia. Second category (four and three 
"yes" – Iran, Qatar, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Syria) represents a 
8  In March 2003 Minister of the Foreign Affairs Tonino Picula visited Iran. In October of the 
same year President of the Republic Stjepan Mesić visited Libya. In 2004 he visited Jordan. In No-
vember of the same year Minister of Foreign Affairs Miomir Žužul attended the funeral of Yasser 
Arafat in Cairo, alongside high ranking diplomats and heads of states and governments of other 
countries. In 2005 Prime Minister Ivo Sanader made a visit to Jordan (February) and Israel (June). 
In 2005 president Mesić visited Israel twice and Jordan once. He again visited Jordan in 2007. In 
February 2007 Minister of the Foreign Affairs Kolinda Grabar Kitarović visited Cairo. In 2008 
president Mesić made state visits to Syria and Israel, and two state visits to Jordan. In 2009 he 
again visited Israel and Jordan, alongside Egypt and Oman. Prime Minister Sanader also made a 
visit to Israel in October 2008. The Minister of the Foreign Affairs Gordan Jandroković in October 
2009 visited UAE, Qatar and Oman. In May the next year he visited Israel. President Mesić visited 
Qatar in February 2010, and the new President of the Republic Ivo Josipović visited Libya in the 
November of the same year. Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor visited Libya in September and Egypt 
in December of the same year. Prime Minister Kosor also visited Israel in March 2011. Minister of 
the Foreign Affairs Vesna Pusić visited Egypt and Qatar in November 2012. President Josipović also 
visited Qatar during the same month. Furthermore he made two visits to Israel in 2012. During 
these visits he also visited Golan Heights and Palestinian Authority.
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country of medium political-diplomatic significance for Croatia. Third 
category (two or one "yes") represents a county of low political-diplo-
matic significance for Croatia.
Again, the countries with which Croatia has established only diplo-
matic relations or has at least one signed agreement during the period 
between 2001 and 2012 are seen as irrelevant (Bahrain, Iraq, Yemen and 
Saudi Arabia). Bilateral relations (in the area of defence) with the coun-
tries in the Middle East and North Africa are very scarce – Croatia does 
not have an accredited military envoy in any of the countries, and only 
Iran has a military envoy accredited for Croatia; bilateral defence coop-
eration is very humble and visible only in the last year or so.9
To rank all the countries of Middle East, according to their impor-
tance for the Croatian economy in the period between 2001 and 2012 
we have created a table of Croatian export to Middle East in thousands 
of Euros (Appendix 2)10 and Chart 2. According to export data from 
2001 to 2012 it was also easy to identify the economic significance of 
each Middle Eastern country for the Croatian economy. The first place 
undisputedly belongs to the UAE with the Croatian export reaching 
775.1 million Euros. The lowest value of goods that Croatia exported to 
a Middle Eastern country was to Yemen with the export worth only 8.4 
million Euros.
The independent variable was again economic importance, but not 
the size of diaspora since Croatia has no diaspora in the Middle East-
ern countries. Besides that, we repeated the same process from above. 
9  In this sense the training of military pilots from Oman in Croatia is the only real and visible 
bilateral arrangement (during 2014 12 Omani pilots were educated in Croatia). Cooperation with 
Iraq is taking place only in the context of NATO membership, or rather as participation in the 
NATO training mission in Iraq. Beside that only small, more or less courtesy, visits of high officials 
of the Ministry of defence to the Armed Forces of Qatar (in March of 2014 the chief of staff of the 
Armed Forces of Republic of Croatia visited the international exhibition and conference on naval 
defence and maritime security "DIMDEX 2014" in Qatar), Morocco (the Minister of Defence Ante 
Kotromanović visited Morocco in April 2014), and Oman (in June 2014 the chief of staff of the 
Armed Forces of Republic of Croatia visited Oman in the official visit to Omani armed forces), and 
the Qatari military delegation to Croatia, which was put in the context of promotion of Croatia’s 
military industry (www.morh.hr).
10  The original data for Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria and Tu-
nisia in the years 2001 and 2002 was in USD currency. The currency was exchanged to Euros 
according to values that were in force on the dates January the 1st 2001 and 2002. The original data 
for Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and UAE from the year 2001 
until and including 2009 were in USD currency. The currency was exchanged to Euros according to 
values that were in force on January the 1st 2001 until January the 1st 2009. The rest of the data was 
originally in Euros.
B. Zgurić, L. Kos-stanišić, s. Domjančić: Comparison of Croatian foreign poLiCy ...
IzvornI znanstvenI rad  PrImljen: 11.5.2015.
24 Europske studije – European Studies   2015  1  (1)  5-32
Variable measuring political-diplomatic importance is constructed by 
adding several elements that identify the strength of political-diplomat-
ic links. These include the presence of an embassy, the presence of a 
consulate and the presence of an inter-parliamentary friendship group, 
and the occurrence of a state visit. All of these elements are coded as 0 or 
1 if any of the elements is present. The fifth element includes the number 
of bilateral treaties signed in the period between 2001 and 2012, and 
here countries are separated into three groups, where countries with 
only a diplomatic recognition treaty are coded as 1, countries that have 
between one and three other treaties are coded as 2, and countries that 
have more than four treaties are coded as 3. The variable measuring the 
strength of political-diplomatic links is constructed by adding all these 
five elements into a single variable where each element makes up 20% of 




Chart 2: Croatian export to Middle East in millions of Euros (2001-2012) 
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the final value of the variable. The contribution of the variable measur-
ing the number of bilateral treaties is calculated by dividing this variable 
by 3.
The variable determining the economic importance is measured by 
the size of Croatian exports to the countries of Middle East measured 
in Euros. Given the presence of a very high range of values which re-
flect not only economic importance but also the size of the country, and 
the presence of outliers with very high values, this variable is convert-
ed so that a natural log of the number measuring the size of exports is 
taken. All the values on both variables were again averages from the 
period between 2001 and 2012. Preliminary analysis indicates a lack of 
correlation between political-diplomatic significance and economic im-
portance for Middle Eastern countries. Figure 1 shows the relationship 
Figure 1: Relationship between economic importance and political 
diplomatic-significance
 18
The variable determining the economic importance is measured by the size of Croatian 
exports to the countries of Middle East measured in Euros. Given the presence of a very high 
range of values which reflect not only economic importance but also the size of the country, 
and the presence of outliers with very high values, this variable is converted so that a natural 
log of the number measuring the size of exports is taken. All the values on both variables were 
again averages from the period between 2001 and 2012. Preliminary analysis indicates a lack 
of correlation between political-diplomatic significance and economic importance for Middle 
Eastern countries. Figure 1 shows the relationship between economic importance and political-
diplomatic significance for both regions. Green regression line for Latin America confirms the 
impact of exports on political-diplomatic links in that region, while blue, slightly negative but 
non-significant regression line, shows the lack of connection between exports and our main 
variable of interest in the Middle East region.  
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between economic importance and political-diplomatic significance for 
both regions. Green regression line for Latin America confirms the im-
pact of exports on political-diplomatic links in that region, while blue, 
slightly negative but non-significant regression line, shows the lack of 
connection between exports and our main variable of interest in the 
Middle East region.
4. Conclusion
Quantitative analysis has confirmed that during the period between 
2001 and 2012 there was a high degree of correlation between politi-
cal-diplomatic importance on the one hand and economic importance 
and size of the diaspora on the other, but only in Latin America. It is 
apparent that this relationship is mostly driven by the importance of 
three countries with somewhat higher economic importance and a very 
large number of citizens with Croatian ethnic origin, namely Argentina, 
Brazil and Chile. Furthermore, bilateral relations between Croatia and 
Latin American countries are good but not developed. The reason for 
this is the geographical distance of Latin America and the perception 
of unimportance of the majority of countries, and that will not change.
There is no correlation between economic and diplomatic impor-
tance of Middle Eastern countries for Croatia. Therefore, Croatia’s for-
eign policy towards these countries is not influenced by the economic 
incentive. However, as mentioned above, Middle East is a region that 
generates a lot of international (in)security issues. Like many Middle 
Eastern countries, Croatia is a Mediterranean country, as well. As the 
security situation in Iraq, Syria and Libya deteriorates Croatia should 
be wise to reshape its foreign policy toward the mentioned region. If 
the economic incentive is not enough to establish closer diplomatic ties, 
security imperative should be a reason enough to form at least closer 
relations along the security line.
With Croatian accession into the EU in 2013, we can conclude that 
Croatian foreign policy has achieved the most important goal and is 
now in a need of re-conceptualization. The country has to change its 
single-objective based foreign policy to join NATO and EU for a mul-
tiple-objectives foreign policy approach. It will need to harmonise its 
own priorities with those of other EU members. Information regarding 
Croatian foreign policy priorities in 2013 can be found on the webpage 
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of the Croatian Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs. They are: po-
sitioning within the EU institutions, positioning in the region, coopera-
tion with NATO partners, multilateral cooperation and Special Projects 
(www.mvep.hr).
Croatia could in the future be a very important case to show how a 
former Third Country, from the region of Western Balkans, is reshaping 
its foreign policy and how Europeanization takes place. In this sense 
Croatia can choose between three major foreign policy transfer strat-
egies – Croatia could download, upload or crossload Europeanization 
(Ruano, 2013). This pretty much means that Croatia could adapt its 
foreign policies towards mentioned regions to the EU policies. Croatia 
could maybe try to form its own policies and transfer them to the EU 
level or by actively working with other EU partners a policy crossload or 
policy convergence could take place.
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